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Secrecy capacity of a finite degraded wiretap channel
Statement
If is a finite degraded wiretap channel in the sense of Finite degraded wiretap channel, then all four operational capacities in Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities are equal to
where ranges over probability vectors on the finite input alphabet and the output law is induced by . The maximum is attained.
Facts & Assumptions
Given: A finite wiretap channel with a stochastic degradation kernel satisfying .
Finite degraded wiretap channel: for every input law , ; this factorization is the finite Markov condition written .
Finite mutual information: mutual information is finite joint-law KL in nats.
Finite entropy and mutual-information chain rules: finite mutual information satisfies its chain rule.
The finite wiretap auxiliary has cardinality at most |X|: the auxiliary objective's maximum is attained, and is continuous on the finite input simplex.
Strong-secrecy capacity of a finite DMC wiretap channel: each of the four operational weak/strong secrecy capacities equals the maximum over finite .
Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities: the four operational capacities use the rate, reliability, and secrecy limits stated in its Definition.
Proof
Fix any finite and form the joint law , which is the notation . For each with , the degraded factorization [F1] makes under the posterior law , so [F4] gives . Averaging over yields .
Conversely, for any input law , take . Then holds and . Thus the supremum over auxiliaries is at least the supremum of the displayed single-letter objective.
The Markov condition gives , so the chain rule [F3] yields . Likewise gives . Subtracting these identities and using step 1.1 shows
By [F5], choose an auxiliary law attaining the maximum in the general formula. Step 2.1 shows that replacing this law by at the same marginal cannot decrease its value, so this input law attains the maximum of the single-letter expression. Every input law is itself an allowed auxiliary with by step 1.2. Thus the auxiliary maximum equals the displayed maximum, and [F6] identifies it with all four capacities in the sense of [F7].
Depends on
- Finite degraded wiretap channel
- Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities
- Finite mutual information
- Finite entropy and mutual-information chain rules
- Data processing for a finite Markov chain, with equality condition
- The finite wiretap auxiliary has cardinality at most |X|
- Strong-secrecy capacity of a finite DMC wiretap channel
Used by
Dependency tree · two levels
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Sources
- Abbas El Gamal and Young-Han Kim, Network Information Theory, arXiv:1001.3404v3 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Paul Cuff, Princeton ELE 538: Information Theoretic Security, Lecture 11 (standard reference, not scraped)