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Strong-secrecy capacity of a finite DMC wiretap channel
Statement
Let be a finite wiretap DMC as in Finite discrete memoryless wiretap channel and code model, with no input-cost constraint, feedback, or preshared secret key. Let
where means the joint law factors as . The maximum is attained with . The four capacities defined in Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities are equal:
Facts & Assumptions
Given: A finite wiretap channel, the code model of Finite discrete memoryless wiretap channel and code model, and the four operational capacities of Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities.
Finite discrete memoryless wiretap channel and code model: is row-stochastic on finite alphabets; its block law is ; encoders have no feedback or preshared key, messages are uniform, and Eve knows the code description.
Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities: is achievable when , the selected error criterion tends to zero, and the selected weak or strong secrecy limit holds.
Information leakage and equivocation for finite observations: leakage is in nats and its normalized value is .
Weak and strong secrecy for wiretap code sequences: weak secrecy is ; strong secrecy is .
Finite mutual information: for finite variables, and its finite sum is in nats.
Finite entropy and mutual-information chain rules: for finite variables, mutual information obeys the chain rule and .
Fano bound for erasure and out-of-alphabet estimates: if a uniform message is estimated from a finite observation with error probability , then .
Information-density concentration for a fixed finite DMC input law: for a fixed finite DMC input law, its IID information-density sum has two-sided Chebyshev concentration about and an exponential upper tail above for every .
Finite DMC resolvability by random codebooks: for an induced finite DMC , a uniform codebook of IID codewords has expected output divergence from tending to zero whenever .
The finite wiretap auxiliary has cardinality at most |X|: every finite is dominated in by an auxiliary of size at most , and the maximum is attained.
The finite wiretap product law is stochastic: the finite wiretap block product is stochastic; the product formula preserves the coordinatewise memoryless factorization.
Finite KL divergence is nonnegative with equality exactly at equal laws: finite relative entropy is nonnegative.
Proof
Let . A constant gives value zero, so . By [F10] the maximum is attained with finite , and [F5] makes each mutual information finite, so . For any fixed finite , restrict to its positive-mass values and define the induced Bob and Eve channels Each row sums to one because and the marginals are stochastic. These induced channels are finite DMCs, and their input-output mutual informations are and .
Suppose and fix any . By [F10], choose a maximizing law . Choose with , then choose so that . Choose with . For each , set , , and independently draw words from .
If , the one-message code has zero error and zero leakage at every blocklength, so all four capacities are at least zero. In all cases, strong secrecy implies weak secrecy because [F5] and [F12] give for ; maximal error tending to zero implies average error tending to zero.
For the converse, consider any sequence of wiretap codes with average error and weak leakage satisfying . Fano's bound [F7] gives The binary entropy is bounded by , since [F12] applied to and gives .
For , set , with empty strings omitted, and set . The mutual-information chain rule [F6] gives Indeed, for each , and the sum telescopes.
For a selected codebook, encode message by choosing uniformly and, conditional on , draw according to using independent private draws at the coordinates. Thus the induced channels from to Bob and Eve are the finite DMCs and , with block laws and . For an output with , declare erasure; it has probability zero because every sampled letter has positive -mass and . For an output with , assign score if and otherwise use its log likelihood ratio. Decode the pair as the unique codeword satisfying ; output its message coordinate , and declare erasure if no unique pair passes. Under the transmitted pair, the missed-threshold probability is at most by [F8]. For any incorrect pair, its independently drawn word is independent of the received under the random-code ensemble, and on the support of . On the threshold event the likelihood ratio exceeds , so its indicator is bounded above by the ratio times ; taking expectations bounds the false-alarm probability by that exponential. If the true pair uniquely passes, the message is decoded correctly; hence message error is bounded by the missed-threshold event or the union of false-alarm events. The union bound over at most incorrect pairs tends to zero: since , , and . Thus the ensemble average message error tends to zero.
The code and channel law factor as In this finite sum, the time- factor separates from all other coordinate factors. Therefore, after summing over the other inputs and outputs, whenever the conditioning event has positive probability. This proves conditional on each positive-mass . Thus is a finite auxiliary law allowed in the maximum defining . By [F10], Average over positive-mass and sum over in step 1.5 to obtain .
Use the same conditional product encoder law with independent private coordinate draws as in step 2.1. Summing over through the product wiretap kernel gives the induced Eve DMC block law , where . Eve's conditional output law for message is the mixture of the induced outputs. Let be the average over of its KL divergence from . For each fixed , its randomization subcode has exactly the IID codebook law in [F9], so . Let be the codebook's average Bob error. Step 2.1 and finite averaging give . Fix an ordering of the finite auxiliary alphabet and order its finite word/codebook sets lexicographically. At each , take the first codebook whose is no larger than its finite ensemble mean. Such a codebook exists by finite averaging, so this specifies a sequence with without countable choices.
Write and, for each message , write for its Bob error and . Delete every message with or , where . For each message, ; averaging over the uniform message bounds the deleted fraction by . Thus for all sufficiently large the retained fraction tends to one and is positive, and each retained message has both . Restrict the encoder to retained messages and map any old decoder output outside the retained set to erasure; this cannot increase the error for a retained message. For the finitely many earlier blocklengths use a one-message code.
For the uniform message on the retained set , put . Expanding the finite KL sums and grouping terms gives the exact identity The reference law has positive mass wherever any induced Eve output has positive mass, so all terms are finite. By [F12], . Also and , while ; hence . This constructs a maximal-error, strong-secrecy sequence at rate at least , and therefore every is achievable for all four criteria.
Substitute step 2.2 into step 1.4, divide by , and use , , and to get . This converse applies to weak secrecy and average error; it also bounds strong-secrecy or maximal-error sequences because each implies the corresponding weaker condition. Together with the achievability and zero-capacity branches, all four operational capacities equal .
Depends on
- Finite discrete memoryless wiretap channel and code model
- Operational weak and strong secrecy capacities
- The finite wiretap product law is stochastic
- Information leakage and equivocation for finite observations
- Weak and strong secrecy for wiretap code sequences
- Finite mutual information
- Finite entropy and mutual-information chain rules
- Fano bound for erasure and out-of-alphabet estimates
- Information-density concentration for a fixed finite DMC input law
- Finite DMC resolvability by random codebooks
- The finite wiretap auxiliary has cardinality at most |X|
- Finite KL divergence is nonnegative with equality exactly at equal laws
Used by
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Sources
- Abbas El Gamal and Young-Han Kim, Network Information Theory, arXiv:1001.3404v3 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Paul Cuff, Princeton ELE 538: Information Theoretic Security, Lecture 12 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Paul Cuff, Princeton ELE 538: Information Theoretic Security, Lecture 13 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Matthieu R. Bloch and J. Nicholas Laneman, Strong Secrecy from Channel Resolvability, arXiv:1105.5419 (standard reference, not scraped)