How statement and proof provenance work
The first chip identifies the source of the statement or construction; the second identifies the source of its local proof or verification.
- Literature-sourced: the exact statement appears in a cited source; only wording and notation differ.
- AI-adapted: a semantically identical restatement of literature-sourced material, modulo indexing, notation, and boundary cases adopted by the library.
- AI-generated: a genuinely novel statement formulated by AI, with no source for the claim itself.
These labels describe origin, not correctness: citations and verification chips remain separate evidence.
Secrecy and correctness are separate requirements
Example
For , no abort, a one-element transcript, and a one-dimensional adversary system, consider two finite output laws. In the first, Alice's key is uniform but Bob always outputs its complement: secrecy error is and correctness error is . In the second, both parties always output : correctness error is and secrecy error is . Thus neither condition implies the other.
Facts & Assumptions
Given: The two normalized classical output states described in the Example.
Abort-aware real and ideal QKD outputs and security errors: the correctness error is the probability of unequal accepted outputs, and secrecy compares Alice's accepted key with a uniform key independent of transcript and Eve.
Trace Distance: trace distance of density operators is half the trace norm of their difference.
Trace Norm Spectral Formula: for an orthogonal diagonal decomposition, the trace norm is the sum of absolute eigenvalues.
QKD composable secrecy is bounded by correctness plus secrecy: the real-ideal distance is at most the sum of the correctness and secrecy errors.
Verification
Given: Let and , with Eve's one-dimensional factor suppressed.
For , Alice's marginal is , so it is already uniform and independent of the trivial transcript-adversary state; hence . Every output pair differs, so . The real state is supported on while the ideal state is supported on the orthogonal set . Their difference therefore has positive and negative parts each of trace one, giving by [F2]–[F3].
For , the parties always agree, so . Alice's accepted state is , and has eigenvalues ; hence . The real-ideal output difference has the same two eigenvalues, so . Both cases satisfy [F4] with equality, while each has exactly one of the two component errors zero.
Depends on
Used by
Nothing in the library uses this result yet.
Dependency tree · two levels
33 results within two dependency steps of this one, each drawn at its shortest distance from it. An arrow runs from a result to what uses it, so the chart reads left to right and ends at this result, which carries a heavier outline. Every node is a link to that result. Click elsewhere on the chart to enlarge it.
Sources
- Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner, Cryptographic Security of Quantum Key Distribution (2014), §4.3 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Joseph M. Renes, Quantum Information Theory, ETH Zürich lecture notes (HS2014; revised 4 February 2015), §8.3 (standard reference, not scraped)