How statement and proof provenance work
The first chip identifies the source of the statement or construction; the second identifies the source of its local proof or verification.
- Literature-sourced: the exact statement appears in a cited source; only wording and notation differ.
- AI-adapted: a semantically identical restatement of literature-sourced material, modulo indexing, notation, and boundary cases adopted by the library.
- AI-generated: a genuinely novel statement formulated by AI, with no source for the claim itself.
These labels describe origin, not correctness: citations and verification chips remain separate evidence.
Finite authenticated key-distribution protocol
Definition
Fix finite nonempty sets and of key values and public transcripts, respectively, and fix an ordering of each finite set. Choose a symbol and order by placing after the ordered keys. The full key registers and are copies of , with computational basis labelled by ; the transcript register is , with basis labelled by , using Finite registers and their ordered computational bases. For accepted-state calculations, identify the subspaces spanned by the key vectors , , with ; operators on these subspaces are embedded in the full key registers by zero extension. A finite two-party key-distribution protocol is a finite-round interaction of Alice and Bob in which each quantum register is nonzero and finite-dimensional, every local quantum operation is a quantum channel or finite instrument (Finite-dimensional quantum channel, Finite instruments and conditional states), and every classical message alphabet is finite. Eve's operation on each insecure quantum transmission is a channel from the sent register and her current memory to the received register and her updated memory. The parties communicate through an ideal authenticated public channel: each message is delivered unchanged to its intended honest recipient, and Eve receives a copy. The transcript records all such messages, including messages that lead the protocol to abort. This is an assumption about the communication resource; it does not prove security of an authentication implementation. Any implementation error must be included in the abort convention or in an additional security parameter.
For each allowed adversarial strategy, the final output is a normalized state, classical in the key registers and transcript register , on , where is Eve's retained finite-dimensional quantum system. Both honest parties output the common abort symbol on an abort. In the ordered product basis this state has the form
where every block and is nonnegative and the sum of their traces is . The trace of each block is the joint probability of its displayed classical labels. All registers and tensor factors retain the displayed order. The transcript is included separately from so that secrecy below explicitly conditions on the public messages as well as Eve's quantum information.
Depends on
- Density operator
- Finite-dimensional quantum channel
- Finite instruments and conditional states
- Instrument outcome weights normalize
- Positive-probability instrument branches are density operators
- Finite registers and their ordered computational bases
- Ordered tensor registers, their inner product, and wire permutations
Used by
- Abort-aware real and ideal QKD outputs and security errors Definition
- Acceptance probability weights an otherwise imperfect one-bit key Example
- Secrecy and correctness are separate requirements Example
- The abort-aware ideal output and conditional marginals are states Lemma
- QKD composable secrecy is bounded by correctness plus secrecy Theorem
Dependency tree · two levels
26 results within two dependency steps of this one, each drawn at its shortest distance from it. An arrow runs from a result to what uses it, so the chart reads left to right and ends at this result, which carries a heavier outline. Every node is a link to that result. Click elsewhere on the chart to enlarge it.
Sources
- Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner, Cryptographic Security of Quantum Key Distribution (2014), §§3.1–3.3 (standard reference, not scraped)
- M. Ben-Or, M. Horodecki, D. W. Leung, D. Mayers, and J. Oppenheim, The Universal Composable Security of Quantum Key Distribution (2005), §§2 and 4 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Joseph M. Renes, Quantum Information Theory, ETH Zürich lecture notes (HS2014; revised 4 February 2015), §8.3 (standard reference, not scraped)
- John Watrous, The Theory of Quantum Information (2018), §§2.2.2–2.3.2 (standard reference, not scraped)