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QKD composable secrecy is bounded by correctness plus secrecy
Statement
For every finite authenticated key-distribution protocol and each fixed allowed adversarial strategy, let , , and be as in Abort-aware real and ideal QKD outputs and security errors. Then
Consequently, if correctness and secrecy errors are bounded uniformly over all allowed adversarial strategies by and , respectively, then the real-ideal trace distance is uniformly at most their sum.
Facts & Assumptions
Given: A finite protocol, one allowed adversarial strategy, and its output state and error quantities from the Definition.
Abort-aware real and ideal QKD outputs and security errors: the ideal output has the same abort blocks as the real output, and on acceptance is the uniform shared key tensored with the actual transcript-adversary marginal; and include the acceptance weighting.
The abort-aware ideal output and conditional marginals are states: the normalized real and ideal full outputs and all normalized accepted marginals in the trace distances are density operators; the zero-acceptance case gives identical outputs.
The finite classical key-copy map is a quantum channel: copies each classical Alice-key block into the shared key block and leaves transcript and adversary factors unchanged.
Replacing Bob's key by a copy of Alice's costs the correctness error: for the accepted state, copying Alice's key changes it by trace distance exactly .
Trace norm of a finite classical block operator: block-diagonal trace norms add over finite classical labels.
Trace Distance and Trace Norm Duality And Norm Properties: state trace distance is half the trace norm and the trace norm satisfies the triangle inequality and scalar homogeneity.
Proof
If , [F2] gives ; both errors are zero by [F1], so the claim holds. Suppose , and write for the normalized accepted real state and for the normalized accepted ideal state. The abort blocks cancel in the real-ideal difference. By [F5] the remaining block is the accepted block scaled by , so [F6] gives .
Define . The state is classical in and , and the copy formula [F3] gives by replacing Bob's accepted key with Alice's. Thus [F4] gives , where .
The uniform product input is classical in , and [F3] gives . The difference has one self-adjoint block for each ; after copying, exactly those blocks occupy slots and every other slot is zero. The block trace-norm identity [F5] therefore gives .
By the triangle inequality from [F6], steps 1.2–1.3 yield . Multiply by and use [F1]: because mismatch occurs only on acceptance, and . Step 1.1 now gives . Since the strategy was arbitrary, the uniform statement follows by applying the same inequality to each strategy.
Depends on
- Finite authenticated key-distribution protocol
- Abort-aware real and ideal QKD outputs and security errors
- The finite classical key-copy map is a quantum channel
- Trace norm of a finite classical block operator
- Replacing Bob's key by a copy of Alice's costs the correctness error
- The abort-aware ideal output and conditional marginals are states
- Trace Distance
- Trace Norm Duality And Norm Properties
Used by
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Sources
- Christopher Portmann and Renato Renner, Cryptographic Security of Quantum Key Distribution (2014), Theorem 4.1 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Joseph M. Renes, Quantum Information Theory, ETH Zürich lecture notes (HS2014; revised 4 February 2015), §8.3, Proposition 8.3.1 (standard reference, not scraped)
- John Watrous, The Theory of Quantum Information (2018), Chapter 1, §1.1.3 (standard reference, not scraped)