How statement and proof provenance work
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These labels describe origin, not correctness: citations and verification chips remain separate evidence.
Basic adaptive composition
Statement
Let be the finite-support count functions on a nonempty record universe, with neighbors formed by adding or removing one record occurrence. Let and let be measurable output spaces. For each round , let be a probability kernel on for every database and prior transcript . Suppose that for every neighboring pair , every prior transcript , and every measurable event ,
where and . If , then the full transcript is -differentially private on the finite product sigma-algebra.
Statement references
Facts & Assumptions
Given: The finite sequence of history-dependent probability kernels, common neighboring-database relation, and the conditional event inequalities in the Statement.
Differential privacy is the event inequality for every ordered neighboring pair; its database source has the power-set sigma-algebra, so all event-evaluation functions of the database are measurable.
Probability kernels have measurable event evaluations and probability-measure sections.
Finite product sigma-algebra is generated by measurable rectangles.
Sections of product-measurable sets are measurable.
Kernel integration measurability: integrating a nonnegative product-measurable function against a probability kernel gives a measurable function of the history.
Bounded-function extension: a prefix event inequality extends to every measurable function with values in with the same additive error.
Kernel composition uses iterated integration.
Composed probability kernels remain probability kernels and their event values are the iterated integrals.
The exponential addition formula gives for all real .
Proof
Put and . For fixed and , define for measurable . By [F4], is measurable; taking sections preserves the whole space, complements, and countable disjoint unions, so is a probability measure by [F2]. By [F5], is measurable, so is a probability kernel. Starting with the point mass on , compose these kernels using [F7]–[F8] to obtain transcript laws with . Every transcript-event evaluation is measurable in the database because its sigma-algebra is the power set by [F1]. No choice is used in these finite compositions.
Write and , with . We prove by induction that for every measurable ; it is equality at the one-point prefix . Suppose it holds at , fix an event , and put and . By [F2], [F4], and [F5], these are measurable and lie in . The round- event inequality and imply , because for . Let ; it is measurable and -valued. Integrating first against , applying [F6] to the induction hypothesis, then using and [F9] with , gives . The same argument with interchanged proves the reverse ordered inequality. At , [F1] gives the asserted differential-privacy guarantee.
Depends on
- Differential privacy, databases, and add/remove adjacency
- Differential privacy inequality for bounded measurable functions
- Composition of probability kernels
- Measurability of integration against a kernel
- Measure kernel and probability kernel
- The product sigma-algebra and its finite iterates
- Every section of a product-measurable function is measurable
- Kernel composition is well defined and associative
- The exponential addition formula $\exp(x+y)=\exp(x)\exp(y)$
Used by
Dependency tree · two levels
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Sources
- Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy (standard reference, not scraped)
- Salil Vadhan, The Complexity of Differential Privacy, 2017 manuscript (standard reference, not scraped)