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Current-group and new-group posterior predictions are probability kernels
Statement
Under Finite-group hierarchical Bayesian model, the current-group and new-group predictive assignments of Current-group and new-group posterior prediction are probability kernels from the full data space to for current group , and to for a new group, with their specified sigma-algebras. On every positive finite evidence fiber they are the stated posterior-predictive laws. On zero or infinite evidence fibers, the posterior kernel uses its prior filler, so the predictions are the corresponding prior-predictive laws. For the conditional-law interpretation, extend the model by the following product-kernel construction. Given the latent tuple , draw the observed data from its original observation kernel and independently draw either a future current-group observation from , or a fresh new-group parameter from followed by its observation from . Under this extension, the predictive kernels are conditional laws of the future observations given the observed data. This is a posterior-predictive statement under the specified model, not a frequentist coverage claim.
Facts & Assumptions
Given: A proper hierarchical model, its posterior kernel on , and the future observation kernels specified in the predictive definition.
For every , is a probability measure and conditional law of the latent tuple; it is the normalized posterior on positive finite evidence fibers and equals on zero or infinite evidence fibers. The evidence-positive set is measurable and has prior-predictive probability one. Hierarchical posterior normalization on positive finite evidence
, each current-group , and are probability kernels. Finite-group hierarchical Bayesian model, Current-group and new-group posterior prediction
Integrating a nonnegative measurable function against a kernel gives a measurable function. Measurability of integration against a kernel
Increasing nonnegative limits pass through integrals. Monotone convergence for the integral
Integrating a nonnegative measurable function against a regular conditional law gives the conditional integral on every conditioning event. Conditional integration through a regular conditional law
A proper prior and a probability model kernel define a joint probability law with the iterated-integral identity. A prior and model kernel define a joint law
The finite product of probability kernels with a common source is a probability kernel. Finite products of probability kernels are probability kernels
Proof
Given: The hypotheses in the Statement.
Fix a current group and . For each measurable future-event set , the formula gives zero on and one on the full observation space by [F1] and [F2]. If are disjoint, then ; [F4] passes this increasing limit through the integral and gives countable additivity. The integrand is measurable in by the kernel definition and coordinate projection, so [F3] makes measurable against the posterior kernel . Thus each is a probability kernel from to .
For a new group, define . The empty-set and whole-space evaluations are zero and one. For disjoint , countable additivity of each and [F4] pass the increasing partial sums through the integral; hence is a probability measure. [F3] makes measurable, so is a probability kernel. Mixing over through the measurable coordinate and repeating the countable-additivity argument shows that is a probability measure and [F3] makes its evaluations measurable in . Thus is a probability kernel from to . Its integral through the marginal is the same iterated-kernel law.
For either prediction let be its conditional future-event probability given the latent tuple: for a current group, or for a new group. Steps 1.1–1.2 make a probability kernel. In the stipulated extension, [F7] ensures that the product of the observation kernel and this future kernel is a probability kernel from to the product of data and future-observation spaces; applying [F6] with prior gives a joint probability law on . Because every section of has total mass one, marginalizing out leaves the original joint law of , so [F1] still supplies its posterior conditional law . For data event and future event , the triple law gives . Applying the event identity in [F5] to turns the right side into . This verifies the conditional-event identity for every data event and proves that both predictive kernels are the conditional laws of the future observations. Since off , their exceptional-fiber predictions are the prior-predictive laws.
Depends on
- Current-group and new-group posterior prediction
- Finite-group hierarchical Bayesian model
- Hierarchical posterior normalization on positive finite evidence
- Measurability of integration against a kernel
- Conditional integration through a regular conditional law
- Monotone convergence for the integral
- Measure kernel and probability kernel
- A prior and model kernel define a joint law
- Finite products of probability kernels are probability kernels
Used by
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Sources
- Andrew Gelman, John B. Carlin, Hal S. Stern, David B. Dunson, Aki Vehtari, and Donald B. Rubin, Bayesian Data Analysis, 3rd ed., §5.4 (standard reference, not scraped)
- Alicia A. Johnson, Miles Q. Ott, and Mine Dogucu, Bayes Rules!, Chapter 16, §16.5 (standard reference, not scraped)