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How statement and proof provenance work

The first chip identifies the source of the statement or construction; the second identifies the source of its local proof or verification.

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Private ERM and private online learning — Examples

1 · Prerequisites

2 · Logical flowchart

3 · Definitions, theorems and proofs

None yet.

4 · Examples, counterexamples and false statements

ExampleConstruction: AI-adaptedVerification: AI-adaptedjudge pass (gpt-6-luna)Open item page →

Replacing one full loss vector changes a later action kernel

Example

Let k=2, T=3, and η>0. Compare the all-zero loss sequence with the sequence whose second loss vector is (1,0) and whose first and third vectors are zero. These two fixed inputs differ by replacement of one complete time-step vector. For both inputs the first- and second-round action kernels are uniform on {1,2}. At round three the all-zero input has weights (1,1) and probabilities (1/2,1/2), while the replaced input has weights (e−η,1) and probabilities (1/(1+eη),eη/(1+eη)). In particular, the event that the third action is 1 has probability ratio (1+eη)/2 between the all-zero and replaced inputs.

Example references

Full-information exponential-weight procedure

Per-round replacement privacy guarantee

Dwork and Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, Chapter 11 §11.2: full text.

Facts & Assumptions

Given: Two-action, three-round loss sequences, with η>0 and all loss vectors in [0,1]2.

[F1]

The algorithm initializes both weights at one, draws from their normalized values, and after each round multiplies action j's weight by exp⁡(−ηℓt(j)). Randomized weighted majority with full information

[F2]

Replacing one whole vector at one time step is the adjacency relation used for the online privacy theorem; for every common prior history the action kernel satisfies ordered (2η,0) event inequalities. Private online learning regret under composition

Verification

Given: The two loss sequences in the Example and [F1]–[F2].

1.1givenF1F2

The sequences agree at rounds one and three and differ only at round two, where (0,0) is replaced by (1,0), so they are adjacent by [F2]. Both start with weights (1,1), and the common first loss vector (0,0) leaves those weights unchanged; hence the first- and second-round kernels are uniform.

2.1F1step 1.1algebra

After the second loss vector, the all-zero input still has weights (1,1), while the replaced input has weights (e−η,1). Dividing by their normalizers yields (1/2,1/2) and (e−η/(1+e−η),1/(1+e−η))=(1/(1+eη),eη/(1+eη)).

3.1F2step 2.1algebra∎

For the event {1} at round three, the all-zero probability divided by the replaced-input probability is (1/2)/(1/(1+eη))=(1+eη)/2. Thus the third-round kernels differ, while their ordered ratios remain covered by the theorem's (2η,0) bound from [F2]; this calculation makes no claim that a transcript-level privacy bound fails.

ExampleConstruction: AI-adaptedVerification: AI-adaptedjudge pass (gpt-6-luna)Open item page →

Private ERM on a four-threshold class

Example

Let X={0,1,2} with its power-set sigma-algebra and let hr(x)=1{x≥r} for r∈{0,1,2,3}. On the labeled database D={(0,0),(1,1),(2,0)}, use the private finite-class selector with n=3 and ε>0. In the order r=0,1,2,3, the empirical risks are 2/3,1/3,2/3,1/3 and the selector weights are e−ε,e−ε/2,e−ε,e−ε/2. Its normalizer is 2e−ε+2e−ε/2, so each of the two risk-2/3 thresholds is selected with probability 1/[2(1+eε/2)] and each of the two risk-1/3 thresholds with probability eε/2/[2(1+eε/2)].

Example references

Finite-class empirical-risk selector

Privacy and excess-risk guarantee

Dwork and Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, Chapter 11 §11.1: full text.

Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms, Chapter 4 §4.2: full text.

Facts & Assumptions

Given: The discrete instance space {0,1,2}, thresholds hr for r∈{0,1,2,3}, the stated database D, n=3, and ε>0.

[F1]

The selector uses empirical zero-one risk on the multiset and assigns each hypothesis weight exp⁡(−εnL^D(h)/2) before normalizing over the finite class. Finite-class empirical-risk selection with exponential weights

[F2]

The class consists of the four maps hr(x)=1{x≥r} on the stated domain, and the output probabilities are the normalized finite weights of [F1]. Finite-class empirical-risk selection with exponential weights

Verification

Given: The data, thresholds and selector in the Example and [F1]–[F2].

1.1givenF2algebra

For r=0, the predictions on 0,1,2 are (1,1,1), which disagree with labels (0,1,0) twice. For r=1, predictions are (0,1,1) and disagree once; for r=2, predictions are (0,0,1) and disagree twice; for r=3, predictions are (0,0,0) and disagree once. Dividing by the three records gives risks (2/3,1/3,2/3,1/3).

2.1F1step 1.1algebra

By [F1] with n=3, a risk 2/3 gives weight exp⁡(−3ε(2/3)/2)=e−ε and a risk 1/3 gives weight exp⁡(−3ε(1/3)/2)=e−ε/2. Therefore the normalizer is Z=2e−ε+2e−ε/2.

3.1F1step 2.1algebra∎

Dividing the weights by Z=2e−ε/2(1+e−ε/2) gives probability 1/[2(1+eε/2)] for each risk-2/3 threshold and probability eε/2/[2(1+eε/2)] for each risk-1/3 threshold. The four probabilities sum to one, since the two groups have total masses 1/(1+eε/2) and eε/2/(1+eε/2).

ExampleConstruction: AI-adaptedVerification: AI-adaptedjudge pass (gpt-6-luna)Open item page →

A finite class can make private ERM impractical

Example

Let d≥1, let X={0,1}d with its power-set sigma-algebra, and let C be the class of every map from X to {0,1}. Then ∣C∣=22d and ln⁡∣C∣=2dln⁡2. For fixed 0<α,β<1 and ε>0, the sample-size sufficient condition in the private finite-class ERM theorem becomes n≥24max⁡{2dln⁡2+ln⁡(1/β)εα,2dln⁡2+ln⁡(1/β)α2}. The selector's displayed normalizer sums one weight per classifier, so literal exhaustive evaluation of this class has 22d hypotheses; evaluating each of them on all m records by the direct method uses m 22d loss evaluations. This counts the direct exhaustive implementation only and is not a lower bound for every algorithm exploiting the structure of the class.

Example references

Finite-class empirical-risk selector

Finite-class private ERM sample-size bound

Dwork and Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy, Chapter 11 §11.1: full text.

Shalev-Shwartz and Ben-David, Understanding Machine Learning: From Theory to Algorithms, Chapter 4 §4.2: full text.

Facts & Assumptions

Given: An integer d≥1, the discrete domain X={0,1}d, the class of all binary maps on X, and fixed parameters 0<α,β<1, ε>0.

[F1]

The private ERM sample-size condition for a finite class of size at least two is 24 times the maximum of the privacy and squared-accuracy terms involving ln⁡∣C∣+ln⁡(1/β). Private finite-class ERM excess-risk bound

[F2]

The selector normalizer is a sum of one positive empirical-risk weight for every hypothesis in the finite class. Finite-class empirical-risk selection with exponential weights

Verification

Given: The finite domain, class and parameters in the Example and [F1]–[F2].

1.1givenalgebra

There are two independent choices for each of the d coordinates of a point in {0,1}d, so ∣X∣=2d.

2.1givenstep 1.1algebra

A map h:X→{0,1} is determined by one binary value at each of the 2d domain points, and every such assignment defines a map. Hence there are 22d maps, so ∣C∣=22d and ln⁡∣C∣=2dln⁡2.

3.1givenF1step 2.1algebra

Since d≥1, ∣C∣≥2. Substituting ln⁡∣C∣=2dln⁡2 into [F1] gives exactly the displayed sufficient sample-size condition.

4.1F2step 2.1algebra∎

By [F2], the normalizer contains ∣C∣=22d terms. Directly computing one empirical risk by evaluating its loss on each of the m records takes m loss evaluations; doing this for every hypothesis uses m∣C∣=m 22d such evaluations. This is the cost of that exhaustive procedure; the count alone does not rule out an implementation that exploits structure or samples from the same distribution without explicitly listing every hypothesis.

Sources